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Schiup v. Delo: The Result of Curbing Unlimited
Jurisdiction By Limiting Discretion
The writ of habeas corpus' has long occupied a place of honor
in the hearts of jurists. Sir William Blackstone referred to it as "the
great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement,"2 and
"the most celebrated writ in the English law."3 Chief Justice Salmon
Chase lauded its reach, stating, "This legislation [enacting the writ] is
of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible
case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution,
treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."4
Although the stated purpose of the writ is to free prisoners from
illegal confinement,' it has provided the impetus for some of the
nation's most famous constitutional law cases, from the right to
counsel6 to the death penalty.
However, the halcyon years of the "Great Writ ' are over, and
have been for quite some time. In sharp contrast to the Warren
Court's expansive interpretation of the scope of the writ,9 the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have systematically restricted its availability,0
mainly through the rules of procedural default." "Procedural
1. Professors Liebman and Hertz have written what is perhaps the definitive work
on habeas corpus for practicing attorneys. JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1994).
2. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131.
3. Id. at *129.
4. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1868).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
7. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of
Georgia death sentencing process despite study showing that death sentencing in Georgia
is infected with racial bias).
8. This nickname for the writ was popularized by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) ("[W]hen we say the writ of habeas corpus,
without addition, we most generally mean that great writ which is now applied for; and in
that sense it is used in the constitution.")
9. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 104-55 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun referred to this
process as the Court's "crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims." Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK.
L. REv. 557,567-79 (1994); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation,
16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579,593-602 (1982); see generally Kathleen Patchel, The New
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default" occurs when a state court refuses to hear a habeas corpus
petition, even a potentially meritorious one, because the petitioner
has not brought his claim(s) properly. 2 The habeas decisions of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts preclude the federal courts from
considering the merits of these "defaulted" petitions, absent some
independent outside justification.13 One situation in which a habeas
court may address an otherwise defaulted petition is when the
prisoner shows both "cause" for her failure to comply with proper
procedure and that the underlying constitutional error for which she
seeks relief caused "actual prejudice" to her case.14  The other
justification for which a habeas court may hear the merits of a
defaulted petition is when the petitioner is the victim of a "funda-
mental miscarriage of justice."'" A petitioner may show this by
presenting evidence of her actual innocence of the crime. 6
Although the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception has
been recognized for nearly ten years,' the lower federal courts have
Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 958-1066 (1991) (criticizing the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts' procedural default jurisprudence).
12. See Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamental
Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 379, 379 (1988). These
barred petitions for relief fall into three categories. "Successive" petitions "raise] grounds
identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition." Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986). "Abusive" petitions are those in which "a prisoner
files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that 'disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks.' " Id. (quoting
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963)). "Defaulted" petitions are those which
are barred because they violate a specific procedural rule, such as the contemporaneous
objection rule, which requires a defendant to object to certain constitutional violations at
trial or waive his objection. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1977). There is
considerable overlap between these categories; indeed, a petition may fall into more than
one category. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 333 (1992) (upholding dismissal
of petition containing successive and abusive claims); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,490
(1991) ("The prohibition against adjudication in federal habeas corpus of claims defaulted
in state court is similar in purpose and design to the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine ...
13. See Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 379.
14. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
15. See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,537 (1986);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495;
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454.
17. Although the Supreme Court intimated in several early decisions that such an
exception might be available for habeas petitioners, see infra notes 115-25 and accom-
panying text, a de jure exception to the procedural default rules was not truly established




had some difficulty applying it," and in any event have not allowed
it with any regularity. What is a "colorable showing" of innocence?
What is the level of evidence required to make such a showing? In
Schiup v. Delo,2 ° the Supreme Court confronted these questions.
This Note focuses on the development of the "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" exception to the procedural default rules, and
the present formulation of the exception in Schlup. After reviewing
the factual circumstances of the case and the Court's holding,2' the
Note turns to the extensive case law preceding Schlup.a2 It begins
with a short historical examination of the birth and early development
of the writ of habeas corpus in the United States.' The Note then
examines both the Warren Court's rapid expansion of the jurisdic-
tional scope of habeas 4 and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' use
of procedural default rules to restrict the lower courts' discretion to
exercise their broad habeas jurisdiction.' In the process, the Note
traces the evolution of the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
exception from its inception as an outgrowth of the procedural default
rules26 to its recognition and consequent development as a separate
doctrinal inquiry.27 The Note then analyzes the decision in Schiup,
with emphasis on the majority's formulation of a threshold showing
of "actual innocence."' It examines the claims of the dissenters29
18. See generally John P. Hale, Note, The Federal Circuits' Developmen4 Scope, and
Definition of "Actual Innocence" and the Limitation of the Claim by Herrera v. Collins and
Sawyer v. Whitley, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1025 (1994) (citing many differences
among the federal circuits in the standard used to evaluate innocence claims and the
situations in which innocence claims are allowed).
19. In the words of one commentator, "Of the several hundred reported federal
decisions confronting defaulted claims since [Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96 (establishing
possibility of review of a barred petition contingent upon a sufficient showing of
petitioner's innocence)], few have permitted habeas review via the innocence exception."
Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303, 341 (1993).
According to the Supreme Court, however, the infrequency of its application is one of the
strengths of the standard. See, eg., Schlup.v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851,864 (1995) ("To ensure
that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain 'rare' . . . this Court
explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner's innocence.").
20. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
21. See infra notes 32-82 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 83-157 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 100-57 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 126-57 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 158-199 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 207-39 and accompanying text.
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and concludes that although their reasoning is less persuasive than the
majority's, the concerns they show for aspects of the majority opinion
are well-founded.30 Finally, this Note concludes that while the Court
makes sound use of precedent, the valid concerns raised by the
dissent and the inherent inconsistencies in the Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence will pose future problems for application of the Schiup
standard.31
The factual background of Schiup involved the murder of an
African-American inmate named Arthur Dade, who was stabbed to
death on February 3, 1984 at the Missouri State Penitentiary.32
Three white inmates, including Lloyd Schlup, were charged with
capital murder in connection with Dade's death.33 At Schlup's trial,
the State presented the testimony of two guards, but never offered
any testimony from other witnesses or, for that matter, any physical
evidence linking Schlup to the killing.34 Schlup maintained his
innocence, contending that the State had the wrong man, 5 but he
30. See infra notes 240-55 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 256-72 and accompanying text.
32. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854. Dade was allegedly the victim of a planned "hit" by
members of the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist prison gang. See Brief for
Petitioner at 16, Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (No. 93-7901).
33. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854-55. During the commotion surrounding the lunch hour
at the prison, inmate Rodnie Stewart somehow acquired a cup of steaming liquid and had
thrown it in Dade's face, blinding him to a subsequent attack by inmate Robert O'Neal,
a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, who stabbed Dade repeatedly with a homemade ice
pick. Id. at 855. Dade was further prevented from defending himself by a third inmate,
who leaped on his back and pinned his arms behind him. Id. Two prison guards identified
this third inmate as Lloyd Schlup. Id
34. Id at 855.
35. Id At trial, Schlup relied heavily on two allegations: First, he alleged that the
guards who testified to his presence at the crime scene were mistaken in their iden-
tification. Id at 855 n.6. The first guard was three floors away from the murder and had
an obstructed view of the altercation. Ia The second guard, Schlup contended, had taken
a visitor to Schlup's cell just 30 minutes before the murder and thus had "Schlup on the
brain," which, given the confusion surrounding the murder, could have produced a
misidentification. Id.
Schlup's second and more convincing charge was based on videotape from a prison
security camera. Id at 855. The tape showed that Schlup was the first prisoner to walk
into the prison cafeteria for lunch on the day of the murder and that he went through the
line and got his food. Id Approximately 65 seconds later, several guards ran out of the
cafeteria, responding to the distress call that had gone out after the attack on Dade. Id.
Twenty-six seconds later, Robert O'Neal ran into the cafeteria, dripping blood. He had
broken a window with his hand and had thrown the murder weapon out the window,
cutting himself in the process. Id at 855 n.4. Schlup maintained that it would have been
impossible for him to have participated in the murder and still have been able to return
to the cafeteria 65 seconds before the sounding of the distress call. Id. at 855.
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was nevertheless convicted and sentenced to death.36 After exhaus-
ting his state collateral remedies,37 Schlup filed a pro se petition for
federal habeas corpus relief, which was denied.38
Represented by new counsel, Schlup filed a second petition on
March 11, 1992, claiming that: (1) he was actually innocent and that
executing him would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments,39 (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
interview several alibi witnesses,' and (3) the State had violated
Thus, establishing the timing of the distress call was a critical element of Schlup's
defense: If the distress call had been sounded immediately after the attack, his defense
would be extremely plausible, but a delay of a few minutes between the attack and the
distress call would have given him enough time to participate in the attack on Dade, clean
up, and enter the cafeteria at the time indicated on the videotape. Id
36. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236,243 (Mo.
1987), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Schlup v. Missouri, 482 U.S. 920, 920
(1987). O'Neal and Stewart were tried separately and sentenced, respectively, to death
and 50 years imprisonment without parole. See State v. O'Neal, 718 S.W.2d 498,499 (Mo.
1986) (en banc), cert. denied, O'Neal v. Missouri, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); State v. Stewart, 714
S.W.2d 724, 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
37. See Schlup v. State, 758 S.W.2d 715,717 (Mo. 1988) (en bane) (denying motion for
state post-conviction relief). A prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief is that the
petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1988). See generally 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, §§ 23.3-23.5
(explaining the exhaustion doctrine).
38. Schlup v. Armontrout, No. 89-0020C(3), 1989 WL 513565 at *5 (E.D. Mo. May 31,
1989), aff'd, 941 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 909 (1992). Schlup claimed,
inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview four inmates whom
Schlup claimed had witnessed the attack and could establish his innocence. Id. at *4. Trial
counsel had also failed to interview inmate Randy Jordan, a member of the Aryan
Brotherhood, whom Schlup identified as the third participant in the murder. Id The
district court ruled that Schlup's ineffectiveness claim was procedurally barred because
although he had raised it in his state post-conviction motion, he had failed to do so on
direct appeal in state court. Id. at *3-4.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, Schlup v. Armontrout, 941
F.2d 631, 642 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 909 (1992), but instead of relying on
the alleged procedural default, denied the petition on the merits, finding the performance
of Schlup's trial counsel to be constitutionally effective. Id. at 638-41. The Eighth Circuit
later denied Schlup's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, Schlup
v. Armontrout, 945 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1991), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
Schlup v. Armontrout, 503 U.S. 909 (1992).
39. The Court rejected an essentially identical claim in the much-publicized decision
of Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), although Herrera had not yet been decided
when Schlup filed his second petition for habeas relief. In addressing the "miscarriage of
justice" exception vis-a-vis Schlup's claims of constitutional error, the Court in Schlup
made a concerted effort to distinguish bare-innocence claims, like that in Herrera, from
situations in which the exception is applicable. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying
text.
40. Judge Heaney, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit decision that affirmed the denial
of Schlup's second petition, noted that:
1996]
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Brady v. Maryland41 by failing to disclose critical exculpatory
evidence.42 To buttress his claim of innocence, Schlup attached
several detailed affidavits from inmate witnesses 43 in a traverse to
the State's responsive pleading.4 The district court did not reach the
merits of Schlup's new claims, ruling that Schiup did not provide
adequate cause for failing to raise his new claims more promptly, and
as such, the claims were procedurally barred. 5 The court also
concluded, using the standard from Sawyer v. Whitley,46 that Schlup
had failed to present enough evidence of his innocence to show that
a dismissal of his petition would result in a "fundamental miscarriage
of justice" and therefore justify consideration of his procedurally
barred claims.47
Schiup present[ed] five affidavits of eyewitnesses to the murder, none of whom
were contacted by Schlup's defense counsel, none of whom testified at trial, and
all of whom appear[ed] willing to give their testimony in open court.... This
testimony.., persuasively demonstrates the utter ineffectiveness of Schlup's trial
counsel in failing to investigate the circumstances of Dade's murder.
Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1993) (Heaney, J., dissenting), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 851 (1995).
41. 373 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of material
evidence favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process).
42. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 857.
43. Id. at 858 n.18. These affidavits were all from African-American inmates, which,
given the allegedly racially motivated murder, should have lent them additional credence.
Id. at 862.
44. Id. at 858. The State's response included transcripts of inmate interviews
conducted by prison investigators a few days after the murder. Id. at 857. One of these
transcripts contained an interview with John Green, an inmate serving as a clerk for the
prison unit. Id. In his interview, Green claimed that, at the instruction of a guard, he had
radioed for assistance (thus prompting the distress call) shortly after Dade had fallen. Id.
In his traverse, Schlup contended that this conclusively proved his innocence, as it
indicated that only a short time had passed between the murder and the resulting distress
call. I1d at 857-58.
45. Id. at 858. An "abuse of the writ" may occur when a petitioner includes a claim
in a habeas petition that she could have raised in an earlier petition. See, e.g., Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963). If a petitioner has abused the writ, then her claim
is procedurally barred, the purpose being to deter dilatory tactics and "sandbagging." See
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977). However, under the test set forth in
Sykes, a petitioner may overcome the procedural bar if she shows sufficient cause for not
raising the claim earlier and actual prejudice to her case from the alleged error. Id. at 87;
see also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536,542 (1976) (originating "cause-and-prejudice"
test).
46. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
47. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 858. In response, Schlup filed a motion to set aside the order
of dismissal, calling attention once more to his claim of innocence and supplementing the
motion with additional evidence: Schlup's counsel had managed to locate John Green, see
supra note 44, and had obtained a detailed affidavit in which Green not only confirmed
his post-incident statement regarding the timing of his radio call for help, but also
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Schlup appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, stating
that the district court should have used the more lenient standard
delineated in Kuhlmann v. Wilson48 rather than the Sawyer standard
in determining whether the evidence of his innocence implicated a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" and thereby authorized review
of his petition on the merits.49 The court of appeals upheld the
district court's reasoning, stating that the Sawyer test was proper and
that evidence of Schlup's guilt at his trial foreclosed consideration of
his constitutional claims under Sawyer50
Meanwhile, Schlup's attorney obtained further evidence of
Schlup's innocence-an exculpatory affidavit from Robert Faherty,
one of the prison guards who had supervised the transfer of the
inmates from their cells to the cafeteria.5 On November 15, 1993,
the Eighth Circuit vacated its earlier opinion in favor of a more
detailed analysis, still affirming the denial of habeas, but adding an
extended discussion of Schlup's new evidence and the court's rationale
for denying relief notwithstanding that evidence. 2 Two days later,
identified Randy Jordan rather than Schlup as the third attacker. Id. at 858. In the
affidavit, Green stated that he had not previously identified Jordan for fear that the Aryan
Brotherhood would have had him killed in prison, but, as he had been out of prison for
almost eight years, he no longer feared an attempt on his life. Id. at 858 n.21. The district
court denied the motion without opinion. Id. at 859.
48. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion).
49. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 859. The standard announced in Kuhlmann states that a
petitioner wishing to overcome a procedural bar by claiming that a miscarriage of justice
has occurred in his case must make a "colorable showing of factual innocence."
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454. The Sawyer standard is more stringent, requiring "clear and
convincing" evidence of innocence before a petitioner may use the exception. Sawyer, 505
U.S. at 336.
50. Schlup v. Delo, 1993 WL 409815, at *2-3 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1993), opinion vacated
and superseded, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). One judge
dissented, concluding that Schlup had met both the Kuhlmann standard and a proper
reading of the Sawyer standard. Id. at *3-10 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
51. Brief for Petitioner at App. 2, Affidavit of Robert Faherty, Exhibit B, Schlup v.
Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (No. 93-7901). Faherty stated in his affidavit that on the day
of the murder, Schlup was in his presence for at least two and a half minutes before Schlup
entered the lunchroom, that Schlup was walking at a leisurely pace, and that Schlup did
not seem agitated or nervous. Id at App. 3. Faherty also attested to the reliability of
John Green as a witness. Id. at App. 4. See supra notes 44, 47 for a summary of John
Green's testimony.
52. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 739-44 (8th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
The majority opinion noted in particular some inconsistencies between Green's affidavit
and both his prison interview and his testimony at Stewart's trial. Id. at 742. The Eighth
Circuit dismissed Faherty's affidavit as merely embellishing his earlier testimony. Id. at
743.
Judge Heaney again dissented, concluding that Schlup had presented evidence of his
innocence such that the district court should have addressed the merits of his constitutional
1996]
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the court of appeals denied a suggestion for rehearing en banc. 3
Three judges dissented from the denial, stating that the question of
which standard to apply was a "question of great importance in
habeas corpus jurisprudence," and as such, should have been
addressed.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari"5 "to consider
whether the Sawyer standard provides adequate protection against the
kind of miscarriage of justice that would result from the execution of
a person who is actually innocent." 6
In Schlup v. Delo,57 the Court held in a five to four decision 8
that the Eighth Circuit erred in using the Sawyer standard and instead
should have used the standard from Murray v. Carrier,9 which states
that an otherwise barred claim will implicate a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice," thereby justifying review on the merits, "where
a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent."'  The majority reasoned that a
standard for adjudicating defaulted petitions supported by evidence
of actual innocence must properly balance the individual interest in
avoiding injustice against the systemic interests in finality of
judgments, comity," and the conservation of scarce judicial resour-
ces.62 In the majority's view, the Carrier standard, rather than the
claims. Id. at 744 (Heaney, J., dissenting). He noted with particularity the fact that
Schlup's trial counsel, although given access to all of the post-incident interviews conducted
by prison officials, had not interviewed any of the potential witnesses to the crime, id. at
747 n.5 (Heaney, J., dissenting), and concluded that the case should be remanded for the
district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and address the merits of Schlup's
constitutional claims, if appropriate. Id. at 747, 749 n.7 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
53. Ld. at 754.
54. Id. at 755 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting, joined by McMillian, J., and Woilman, J.).
55. Schlup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994).
56. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 854.
57. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
58. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor (who also
wrote a separate concurrence), Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Ld. at 854. The Chief
Justice dissented, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia also wrote a dissent, in which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 874
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
60. Id. at 495-96. Carrier is part of a trio of 1986 decisions (along with Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986))
that refined and shaped the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the
procedural bar rules. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
61. Judicial comity is "[t]he principle in accordance with which the courts of one state
or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter
of obligation, but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 267 (6th ed.
1990).
62. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862-65.
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Sawyer standard, strikes the proper balance between systemic and
individual interests and therefore should govern the "miscarriage of
justice" inquiry for claims such as Schlup's. 63
The Court then formulated a test to apply in such circumstances,
ruling that to satisfy the Carrier standard, a petitioner needs to show
that it is "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in the light of the new evidence."6" The majority
elaborated that a habeas court is not bound by traditional evidentiary
rules of admissibility in making its assessment, but may consider the
probative value of evidence allegedly illegally admitted or wrongly
excluded.65 Finally, the Court noted that the test is not framed in
terms of the district court's assessment of the existence or nonexis-
tence of a reasonable doubt, but is based instead on a probabilistic
assessment of whether a reasonable juror would find the petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.66
Justice O'Connor concurred, largely in response to the criticisms
from the dissenters.67 In answer to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
claim 6 that the standard articulated by the Court was muddled and
apt to be confused with the Jackson v. Virginia69 standard for legal
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict, she distin-
guished the Schiup inquiry, which focuses on the likelihood of jurors
reaching a specific result, from the Jackson standard, which focuses on
jurors' legal authority to do so.70 Justice O'Connor then turned to
Justice Scalia's contention7' that the section of the habeas corpus
statute concerning multiple petitions72 gives lower court judges
complete discretion in deciding whether to entertain otherwise
defaulted claims. Citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartrnarx Corp.,73 she
63. Id. at 865. For a discussion of the disposition of the case on remand, see infra
note 186.
64. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
65. IdL
66. d. at 868.
67. ld. at 869-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. See id. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
69. 443 U.S. 307, 319-21 (1979) (entitling petitioner to habeas corpus relief if, upon
record evidence, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of a petitioner's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
70. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 874-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). For further discussion of this statute, see infra notes
91-92, 97, and accompanying text and supra note 225 and accompanying text.
73. 496 U.S. 384,402 (1990) (relying on Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,287
(1982), in holding that a finding on review that a lower court's decision was based on an
erroneous view of the law will justify reversal under an abuse of discretion standard).
1996]
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replied that the court of appeals' reliance on an erroneous standard
represented a "paradigmatic" abuse of discretion, and as such, the
Court did not need to decide whether abuse of discretion represented
the proper standard of review.74
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, the Chief Justice
dissented." He placed greater importance on the states' interest in
finality of judgments and asserted that the Sawyer standard strikes the
proper balance between systemic and individual interests.7 6
However, his primary criticism of the majority opinion was with its
exegesis of the Carrier standard, which he felt "water[ed] down" the
original standard and would lead to confusion when lower courts
attempted to apply it." Justice Scalia, also joined by Justice
Thomas, dissented, arguing that the question of whether a habeas
court should reach the merits of a barred petition is governed neither
by the Carrier standard nor by the Sawyer standard, but by statute.
78
According to Justice Scalia, the section of the United States Code
governing successive and abusive petitions79 leaves the decision to
the habeas court's discretion."0 Moreover, he stated, the "fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice" exception, requiring a habeas court to
review a barred petition, was announced by a mere plurality in
Kuhlmann and is therefore not binding precedent." As he found no
duty to address the merits of Schlup's petition, and because he
believed the lower court had not abused its discretion in denying the
petition, Justice Scalia saw no reason to interfere with the court of
appeals' decision.'
The debate over the scope and role of federal habeas corpus
review for state prisoners has occupied a large part of the discussion
surrounding the Great Writ. With roots stretching back to English
74. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This reply, however, rings
somewhat hollow; there may be more effective ways to address Justice Scalia's statutory
concerns. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
75. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870-74 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
76. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This Note suggests that the Chief Justice's
concerns are well-placed; the majority's explanation of the Carrier standard is somewhat
ambiguous. See infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
78. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 874-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). See infra note 225 for the pertinent text of the statute.
80. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra note 138 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the precedential weight of Kuhlmann.
82. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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common law,83 the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to release
a prisoner who is being held unlawfully, that is to say, un-
constitutionally.' This aim is accomplished quite literally: The
typical relief granted to a successful habeas petitioner is a conditional
release.85 In the United States, the federal courts were first given
the authority to issue the write by the Judiciary Act of 1789,86 Which
provided the writ for individuals in the custody of federal authorities.
However, the true beginnings of the current debate stem from an
1867 amendment of the 1789 Act in which Congress, with typical
Reconstruction fervor, broadened the Supreme Court's habeas
jurisdiction to include federal constitutional claims arising in state
courts.87 This broad jurisdiction notwithstanding, the scope of the
writ was quite narrow. Under the 1789 Act, a determination by a
state court of adequate jurisdiction was immune from habeas review,
and a petitioner could challenge a conviction only on grounds related
to the jurisdiction of the state court.88
Another important common-law feature of the writ was that if a
prisoner's petition was denied in one court, the prisoner could make
a renewed application to any other court that had jurisdiction; the
previous denial would have no preclusive effect.89 However, with
the increasing availability of appellate review, the validity of the un-
limited-petitions approach came into question, and courts began to
83. See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 12-94 (1980) (describing the English origins of the writ of habeas corpus).
84. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202
(1830), "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the
commitment."
85. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993). Under a conditional release,
unless the State elects to hold a new trial, the prisoner is set free. See id.
86. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C
§ 2241(a) (1988)).
87. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385; see 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1,
§ 2.4(d), at 40-43.
88. This doctrine was summarized by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830):
The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on
all the world as the judgment of this court would be....
... An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that
judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general
jurisdiction of the subject ....
Id. at 202-03. But see 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 2A(d), at 37-40 (arguing that
the Supreme Court granted relief on nonjurisdictional claims during this period).
89. See DUKER, supra note 83, at 5-6.
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search for ways to limit multiple petitions." Finally, in 1948,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2244.91 This section of the habeas
statute, titled "Finality of Determination," directly addressed the issue
of multiple petitions, stating that federal judges "need not" address
second or subsequent petitions unless (1) the petition alleges a new
ground for relief, and (2) the applicant convinces the judge that he
did not deliberately withhold the claim or otherwise abuse the writ.'
Even though the habeas corpus debate caught the attention of
Congress, the modem era of habeas corpus jurisprudence did not
commence until five years later with the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Brown v. Allen.93 Up to this time, the "jurisdictional"
theory of habeas corpus-that determinations of constitutional claims
by state courts of competent jurisdiction are controlling94-- still
guided the use of the writ.' Justice Reed, writing for the majority,
eradicated sixty years of habeas corpus theory with a stroke of his pen
in Brown, ruling that state adjudication of a federal constitutional
claim does not bar a federal habeas court from reviewing the claim de
novo.96 Ten years later, a trio of habeas decisions would increase
90. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948) (holding that "inadequate"
explanation for previous failure to raise a new claim constitutes grounds for denial of a
successive petition); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,231 (1924) (advocating use of "sound
judicial discretion" in adjudicating second and subsequent petitions); Wong Doo v. United
States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924) (holding that "sound judicial discretion" dictates that
"controlling weight must [be] given to the prior refusal" when second petition contains
claim that was raised, but not argued, in first petition).
91. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 965 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(a) (1988)).
92. Former § 2244 states in pertinent part:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a
judgment of a court of the United States, or of any State, if it appears that the
legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United
States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents
no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court
is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1952) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1988)).
93. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. See DUKER, supra note 83, at 257.
96. In the words of Justice Reed,
[T]he state adjudication carries the weight that federal practice gives to the
conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal
constitutional issues. It is not res judicata.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized the power of the
District Court to reexamine federal constitutional issues even after trial and
review by a state ....
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the availability of the writ even further, allowing the court to reach
the merits of successive and abusive petitions,97 eliminating the
preclusive effect of state court verdicts and procedural bars,98 and
even requiring a habeas court to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon
an insufficient finding of fact by the state court.99
Brown, 344 U.S. at 458-59 (footnote omitted). In a separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter
elaborated, stating:
In exercising the [statutory power of habeas corpus review of federal
constitutional claims], the District Judge must take due account of the
proceedings that are challenged by the application for a writ. All that has gone
before is not to be ignored as irrelevant. But the prior State determination of a
claim under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such
a claim, else the State court would have the final say which the Congress, by the
Act of 1867 [see supra note 87 and accompanying text], provided it should not
have.
Id. at 500 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
97. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1963). At the time of Sanders, § 2244
of Title 28 of the United States Code, governing successive petitions filed by state
prisoners, stated that a habeas court would be required to entertain a successive petition
unless the district judge was satisfied that the "ends of justice" would not be served by
entertaining the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)
(1988)). However, § 2255, which governed petitions by federal prisoners, did not contain
the "ends of justice" language. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Sanders Court held that the "ends of justice" inquiry
was applicable to both federal and state prisoners, finding that the intent of Congress in
enacting § 2255 was to codify then-current habeas corpus practice. Sanders, 373 U.S. at
14. The Sanders Court further held that the "ends of justice" language would apply not
only to successive petitions but also to abusive petitions, which were not addressed by the
statute, stating:
The principles governing both justifications for denial of a hearing on a successive
application [i.e., that the petition was successive or that it was abusive] are
addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges.... [T]heirs must be
the judgment as to whether a second or successive application shall be denied
without consideration of the merits. Even as to such an application, the federal
judge clearly has the power-and, if the ends of justice demand, the duty-to
reach the merits.
ltd at 18-19.
98. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Court ruled, on an issue that Brown
discussed only peripherally, holding that state court procedural bars do not deprive federal
courts of habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 398-99, 426-34. The Court based its holding on the
view that discretionary and not jurisdictional considerations govern habeas review of claims
defaulted on state grounds, id. at 424-36, and set forth a standard for the use of such
discretion by the lower courts, ruling that state forfeitures should not be enforced on
federal habeas rdview unless the petitioner has "deliberately bypassed" state procedures
in order to reach the federal courts, id. at 438.
99. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled in part, Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), the Court expanded the scope of evidentiary review on
habeas, requiring a federal evidentiary hearing in conjunction with a prisoner's habeas
petition unless the state court trier of fact has reliably found the relevant facts after a full
hearing. Id. at 312-13.
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However, the expansion of the scope of habeas corpus review
necessarily came at the expense of the finality of state court
judgments. State court judges, who felt as if their expertise was being
belittled by the Supreme Court, criticized the expansionist ap-
proach."° Federal judges, too, became dissatisfied with what they
saw as the endless process of trial followed by appeal followed by
multiple habeas corpus petitions. 1 ' Moreover, the late 1960s and
early 1970s saw a near-complete replacement of the Warren Court
that had decided Brown" with the more conservative Burger
Court.13'
In 1976 the Burger Court rang in the end of the expansive
interpretation of habeas corpus with its decision in Stone v.
Powell,"° ruling that habeas courts should not entertain illegal
search and seizure claims under the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule where there has been "an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of the claim" in the state courts. 5 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, used a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the
"costs" of the exclusionary rule, including the general "cost" to the
finality of judgments imposed by habeas review, against the utility of
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to unlawful searches. The Stone
Court concluded that while the balance of factors was sufficient to
justify use of the rule at the trial and appellate levels, the added
finality costs of habeas relitigation tipped the balance against
100. See STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 3 n.10, 5-6 (Victor E. Flango ed., 1994).
101. Id. at 5-6.
102. By 1976, the time of the Court's significant withdrawal from the principles of
Brown (in Stone v. Powell, see infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text), none of the
Justices who had taken part in Brown remained on the Court. See COMMISSION ON THE
BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES 1790-1991, at 268-91 (1992) (presenting
a chart of the succession of the Justices of the Court). In fact, six new Justices (Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell, and Stevens) had been appointed since the Court
had decided Sanders, Nola, and Townsend in 1963. Id. Finally, of the three remaining
Justices (Brennan, Stewart, and White) who had decided the 1963 trio of cases, two were
plainly uncomfortable with the post-Brown expansion of habeas review: Justices Stewart
and White had dissented in Townsend, 372 U.S. at 325 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Justice
Stewart had joined Justice Harlan's dissent in Nola as well, 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
103. For a discussion of the "post-Warren" Court's shift to a more conservative criminal
procedure jurisprudence, see JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA (1992).
104. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
105. Id. at 482.
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consideration of exclusionary rule claims on federal habeas
review. 0
6
Stone represented a major turning point in the Court's habeas
corpus jurisprudence. The Brown Court had viewed relitigation of all
constitutional issues as deriving from a congressional mandate, stating
that Congress, not the courts, had the power to decide whether to
allow relitigation of a certain claim."° The Stone doctrine, however,
seemed to empower the federal courts to use their equitable judgment
to determine which claims are justifiably relitigated,"x creating a
discretionary restriction to the extremely broad powers granted the
courts by statute.'09
Wainwright v. Sykes,"' another decision that same term, struck
down Fay v. Noia's "deliberate bypass" standard" for procedural
default."' In Sykes, the Court authorized greater discretion on the
part of habeas courts to enforce state procedural defaults, announcing
that a petitioner wishing to avoid the preclusive effect of state
procedural default rules must show cause for her failure to fie her
constitutional claim properly, and actual prejudice to her case arising
from the alleged constitutional error."' As in Stone, the majority
106. Id at 491-94.
107. In Brown, Justice Frankfurter, writing separately, stated:
[Tihe wisdom of such a modification in the law [denying habeas review of claims
previously adjudicated in state courts] is for Congress to consider .... It is for
this Court to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction as enacted by
Congress. By giving the federal courts that jurisdiction, Congress has imbedded
into federal legislation the historic function of habeas corpus adapted to reaching
an enlarged area of claims.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
108. See Steiker, supra note 19, at 363.
109. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988), states in pertinent part, "[A] district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
110. 433 U.S. 72 (1976).
111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for further discussion of Noia and the
"deliberate bypass" standard.
112. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 ("It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia ... which we
today reject."); see also Steiker, supra note 19, at 329-32 (describing outgrowth of Sykes
from two earlier cases: Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), and Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)).
113. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. It is important to note that the Burger Court's habeas
jurisprudence, while restricting the range in which habeas courts may exercise their
discretion to hear petitions, did not affect the essential holdings of Brown and Noia: The
federal courts still possess the power to relitigate all state determinations of federal issues
and to ignore state procedural bars. See Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 385; Patchel, supra
note 11, at 1024; Steiker, supra note 19, at 324.
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in Sykes balanced the relative interests and interpreted the Court's
equitable powers broadly to create a federal common law restriction
on habeas corpus. 1 4
Against this backdrop, the groundwork was laid for the "fun-
damental miscarriage of justice" exception. In Sykes, then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, suggested that the role of
the writ of habeas corpus was to prevent a miscarriage of justice:
The "cause-and-prejudice" exception ... will afford an
adequate guarantee, we think, that [Florida's procedural
default rule] will not prevent a federal habeas court from
adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim
of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication
will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 5
Two 1982 opinions written by Justice O'Connor explored the
concept of a "miscarriage of justice.'6 In Engle v. Isaac,"7
petitioner's trial counsel failed to object to an unconstitutional jury
instruction regarding the burden of proof for self-defense and thus
defaulted on this claim for purposes of his habeas petition. 8
Justice O'Connor suggested that the normal definition of "cause"
might be expanded in special cases to correct a "fundamentally unjust
incarceration,""' 9 although she did not seem to think that Engle
presented such a case." She expanded upon the notion of habeas
corpus as a device to correct an "unjust" incarceration in United States
v. Frady,2' decided on the same day as Engle. Frady's habeas
petition claimed that his jury had been improperly instructed on the
meaning of malice." Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
held that Frady failed to satisfy the "actual prejudice" prong of the
Sykes standard because the jury would have convicted him even if the
instruction had been correct." However, before she began her
"prejudice" inquiry, Justice O'Connor stated,
114. See Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination
of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 436, 465 (1980).
115. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
116. See Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 390-92.
117. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
118. Id. at 109, 124-29.
119. Id. at 135. However, Justice O'Connor soon backed away from this explanation
of the "miscarriage of justice" exception, concluding that it involves a separate inquiry
from that used to determine cause and prejudice. See Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 391.
120. Engle, 456 U.S. at 135.
121. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
122. ld at 157-58.
123. Id. at 172.
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At the outset, we emphasize that this would be a different
case had Frady brought before the District Court affirmative
evidence indicating that he had been convicted wrongly of
a crime of which he was innocent. But Frady ... did not
assert at trial that he... beat [the victim] to death without
malice.'24
Later in the opinion, she tied Frady's lack of evidence of a wrongful
conviction to the possibility of injustice:
[T]he strong ... evidence of malice in the record, coupled
with Frady's utter failure to come forward with a colorable
claim that he acted without malice, disposes of his conten-
tion.., that reversal of his conviction.., could be justified.
We perceive no risk of a fundamental miscarriage of justice
in this case."12
A trio of 1986 cases, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,26 Murray v. Car-
rier,127 and Smith v. Murray,"s finished the work begun in Engle
and Frady and firmly established the possibility of a "miscarriage of
justice" as a second distinct exception to dismissal of a procedurally
barred claim. The 1986 cases affirmed the basic habeas doctrine that
had come out of Stone, Sykes, and their progeny: Judicial discretion,
rather than statutory jurisdiction, should govern the scope of habeas
corpus review. 29 When a prisoner submits a potentially meritorious
124. Id. at 171.
125. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
126. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
127. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
128. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
129. See Patchel, supra note 11, at 1012-24. See generally Steiker, supra note 19
(arguing that the Court's entire post-Stone habeas corpus jurisprudence represents the use
of equitable principles rather than statutory jurisdiction to define the scope of the writ).
Justice Blackmun expressed his dismay at the course that the Court's habeas
jurisprudence had taken after Brown, singling out the 1986 cases:
By the traditional understanding of habeas corpus, a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in
violation of a federal constitutional right. Justice Holmes explained that the
concern of a federal court in reviewing the validity of a conviction and death
sentence on a writ of habeas corpus is "solely the question whether [the
petitioner's] constitutional rights have been preserved."
In a trio of 1986 decisions [Kuhlmann, Carrier, and Smith], however, the
Court ignored these traditional teachings and, out of a purported concern for
state sovereignty, for the preservation of state resources, and for the finality of
state court judgments, shifted the focus of federal habeas review of procedurally
defaulted, successive, or abusive claims away from the preservation of
constitutional rights to a fact-based inquiry into the petitioner's innocence or
guilt.
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but procedurally barred petition this discretion should be applied in
an attempt to balance the competing equities with an increased regard
for the systemic interests, particularly the finality of judgments. 3
The 1986 decisions refined this doctrine, at the same time giving
shape to the somewhat nebulous systemic interests and, more
importantly, establishing a measure of an individual's interest in
preventing injustice: her innocence.
Prior to Kuhlmann v. Wilson,"' the only way that a habeas
petitioner could have the merits of his procedurally barred claims
heard was to satisfy the Sykes cause-and-prejudice standard,132 the
"miscarriage of justice" in Engle and Frady" notwithstanding. The
plurality decision in Kuhlmann posited a second possibility, stating
that the "ends of justice""M allow a federal habeas court to entertain
a successive petition "where the prisoner supplements his
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 352 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted).
130. The concern for finality was expressed by Justice O'Connor as follows:
We... reject the suggestion that there is anything "fundamentally unfair" about
enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any substantial claim that
the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing deter-
mination. In view of the profound societal costs that attend the exercise of
habeas jurisdiction, such exercise "carries a serious burden of justification."
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986) (citation omitted). The emphasis on accuracy
of verdicts reflects the influence of Judge Henry Friendly. See infra notes 259-60 and
accompanying text. In fact, the quotation at the end of the preceding passage comes from
Judge Friendly's influential law review article. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgements, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 146 (1970).
131. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion).
132. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text for further discussion of Engle and
Frady.
134. Three years after Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), see supra note 97,
Congress had amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to establish different rules for successive petitions
for federal and state prisoners. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, § 1, 80 Stat. 1104
(current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), (c) (1988)). The old § 2244 became the new
§ 2244(a) governing claims by federal prisoners, and retained the "ends of justice"
language upon which the Sanders Court had relied. Id.; see supra note 97 and accom-
panying text. However, the new section governing claims by state prisoners, § 2244(b), did
not include the "ends of justice" language, thus leaving open the question whether the
"ends of justice" should be considered in review of state court convictions.
The Kuhlmann Court determined that the language of the statute revealed the intent
of Congress to give federal courts the discretion to hear successive petitions from both
federal and state prisoners, and stated that "as a means of identifying the rare case in
which federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a successive petition, we
continue to rely on the reference in Sanders to the 'ends of justice.' " Kuhlmann, 477 U.S.
at 451 (plurality opinion).
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constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual in-
nocence."'35 Without citing Kuhlmann, the majority in Murray v.
Carrier3 6 affirmed the same basic reasoning, holding that "in an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default."'37  In so holding, the Carrier
Court not only provided support for the dictum in Kuhlmann,'38 but
also refined the concept of a "colorable showing of factual in-
nocence," framing it in the context of the accuracy of the trial
verdict.' Smith v. Murray"4° emphasized that the miscarriage of
justice exception addressed "actual" as opposed to "legal" in-
nocence. 4  In the context of the case, that meant that the
petitioner could not obtain relief based on the improper admission of
truthful evidence helpful to the prosecution because the petitioner was
"actually" guilty, even though the evidence proving this had been
improperly admitted. 42
Subsequent decisions bear out the conclusion that the 1986 cases
in fact established a second means by which a federal habeas court
could reach the merits of a barred petition, but did little to clarify the
inquiry. In McCleskey v. Zant,43 the majority applied the Carrier
standard in refusing to review the merits of McCleskey's barred
petition, stating that the constitutional error of which the petitioner
complained resulted in the admission of truthful inculpatory evidence
and thus did not result in an unreliable guilty verdict.'" Sawyer v.
135. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (plurality opinion). This concept comes directly from
the writings of Judge Friendly. See Friendly, supra note 130, at 142 ("My thesis is that,
with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only
when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of
innocence.").
136. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
137. Id at 496.
138. Because the Kuhlmann Court affirmed the denial of Wilson's petition, the portion
of Justice Powell's majority opinion that addressed the miscarriage of justice exception was
technically dictum. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 461. In addition, only three other Justices
(Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor) joined the portion of the opinion in which Justice Powell
set forth the exception, relegating that portion to the status of a plurality decision. Id. at
438.
139. See Steiker, supra note 19, at 336-42.
140. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
141. See id. at 541-42.
142. Il at 537-38.
143. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
144. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, stated:
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Whitley 45 presented the question of whether the exception could be
applied to a death sentence." Robert Wayne Sawyer alleged in his
second habeas corpus petition not that he was innocent of the murder
for which he had been sentenced to death, but that he was "innocent"
of the death penalty itself, claiming that various constitutional errors
had prevented the jury from hearing mitigating evidence on his
behalf.'47  The six-justice majority"~ agreed with Sawyer's
reasoning and found that a petitioner who claimed "actual innocence"
of the death penalty could present evidence of this in an attempt to
bypass a procedurally defaulted petition,' 49 but affirmed the denial
of Sawyer's petition on the ground that his evidentiary showing was
insufficient."5 In so ruling, the Sawyer majority used a seemingly
more stringent standard than that in Carrier, stating that for a habeas
petitioner to use the "miscarriage of justice" exception to challenge
his death sentence, he must show by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death
penalty under state law.51
Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in a
further, narrow class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show cause for a
procedural default. These are extraordinary instances when a constitutional
violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. We
have described this class of cases as implicating a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.
... [The miscarriage of justice] exception is of no avail to McCleskey. The
[alleged] violation ... resulted in the admission at trial of truthful inculpatory
evidence which did not affect the reliability of the guilt determination....
McCleskey cannot demonstrate that the.., violation caused the conviction of an
innocent person.
Id at 494, 502 (citations omitted). Note that the majority's focus was not on whether the
jury would have acquitted McCleskey, but rather, if the jury would have been correct in
so doing. It was McCleskey's actual innocence, and not his legal innocence, that mattered.
See Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 392-98 for a further discussion of the significance of
"actual" innocence.
145. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
146. Id at 335.
147. Id at 337-38.
148. All nine Justices agreed in the judgment, but Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and
Stevens refused to join the majority opinion. Id at 335.
149. See id at 340-42.
150. Id. at 349-51.
151. Idt at 336. This finding had two implications in Sawyer's case. First, it presented
him with a higher standard of evidence than if he were seeking habeas review of his
conviction under Carrier. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it doomed his type of
claim from the beginning. Sawyer alleged that constitutional error had prevented the jury
from hearing mitigating evidence in his favor. Id. at 336. However, to find Sawyer eligible
for the death penalty under the Louisiana statute, the jury needed only to find the
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Only a year after confronting the difficult problem of what it
means to be "actually innocent" of the death penalty, the Court was
faced with Herrera v. Collins,' which raised an even more troubling
question. Without alleging constitutional error at his trial or in the
appellate process, Leonel Herrera ified a second habeas corpus
petition accompanied by newly discovered evidence of his innocence
and claimed that his impending execution would thus violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because lie was actually
innocent.53 The Court denied Herrera's petition, stating that his
claims were not eligible for habeas corpus relief" 4 In so ruling, the
existence of one or more statutory aggravating factors, and then was required to balance
aggravating against mitigating factors to guide its discretion whether to impose the death
penalty. See id. at 349-50. As such, even if Sawyer could have proved his claims with
100% certainty, the jury in Louisiana, although it might have been less likely to impose
the death penalty, could still have found Sawyer eligible for the death penalty on the basis
of the aggravating factors. Thus, Sawyer was not "actually innocent" under the majority's
formulation. See id at 349-50. Concurring in the judgment, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor,
and Stevens took issue with the majority's formula for precisely these reasons. See ide at
356-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 365-73 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
152. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
153. Id at 856-57. Herrera was convicted for the murders of tvo police officers. Id
at 857. His newly discovered evidence consisted of the affidavits of an attorney who had
represented Herrera's brother Raul, and one of Raul's former cellmates. Id at 858. Both
men claimed that Raul (who died two years after Herrera's trial) told them that he
committed the killings. Id Although deciding the case on other grounds, the Court gave
little credence to the affidavits, citing particularly Herrera's own confession to the two
murders, factual inconsistencies between the affidavits, their "eleventh-hour" nature, and
the convenient death of the alleged true killer. Id. at 869.
154. Id at 859. Herrera's claim was, in substance, a claim for relief based on newly
discovered evidence, and in the words of the Court, "federal habeas courts sit to ensure
that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors
of fact." Id at 860. However, the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
holds out a tantalizing possibility for capital defendants:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.
But ... the threshold showing... would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The
showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.
Id at 869. Naturally, with dicta this intriguing the Herrera case is the subject of numerous
writings, with correspondingly provocative titles. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Herrera v.
Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 943 (1994); Kathleen Cava Boyd, Note, The Paradox of "Actual
Innocence" in Federal Habeas Corpus After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. REV. 479
(1994); Tara L. Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents
Are Not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603 (1995); Phaedra Tanner, Note, Herrera
v. Collins: Assuming the Constitution Prohibits the Execution of an Innocent Person, Is the
Needle Worth the Search?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1283.
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majority noted that the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception
was inapplicable to Herrera's claim, stating that "a claim of 'actual
innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim [that may be addressed
by a habeas court], but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits." '55
It is rather ironic that, although Herrera, Sawyer, McCleskey, and
the 1986 trio of cases defined and shaped the scope of a second
exception to the procedural default rules, they did so while restricting
the availability of habeas relief in general.156 Moreover, the Court
denied relief in each case because the petitioners did not make
sufficient evidentiary showings of their innocence,5 7 which left the
lower courts without an example of a case in which the Supreme
Court had ruled that use of the "miscarriage of justice" exception was
proper.
Schlup's petition, therefore, confronted the Court with a
dilemma: What does it mean to say that a convicted defendant is
"probably innocent," and more importantly, how does a habeas
petitioner prove such an allegation? The Eighth Circuit used the
Sawyer v. Whitley... test, which required "clear and convincing"
evidence of innocence,159 and decided that Schlup did not meet this
standard."6  Schiup claimed that the Eighth Circuit had erred,161
and instead should have used the standard from Kuhlmann v.
Wilson.62 In deciding the case, the majority undertook a three-part
inquiry.
First, the Court took pains to distinguish the case at hand from
Herrera," finding two important differences. Schlup's claim of
155. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
156. See, e.g., Margolis, supra note 11, at 567-79; Patchel, supra note 11, at 968-82;
Steiker, supra note 19, at 320-69.
157. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1992);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,502 (1991); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,537-38 (1986);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496-97 (1986); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454-55
(1986).
158. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
159. Id. at 336; see supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
160. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 744 (1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
161. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (No. 93-7901).
162. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) ("[W]e conclude that the 'ends
of justice' require federal courts to entertain [procedurally barred] petitions ... where the
prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence."); supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
163. The Court's denial of Leonel Herrera's habeas corpus petition set off a wave of
uproar. See supra note 154. Presumably, by making absolutely clear that its decision in
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innocence, unlike Herrera's, was completely independent of his claim
for relief.1" Quoting Herrera, the majority stated that Schlup's
claim of innocence was "not itself a constitutional claim, but a
gateway through which [Schlup] must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."' 1  More
importantly, the underlying assumptions of the two petitions were
completely different. Herrera had stated that, even if his trial had
been free of constitutional error, his execution would be un-
constitutional because of his innocence.' 66 Schlup, on the other
hand, asserted that his trial had been infected with constitutional
error,167 and, in effect, pointed to his alleged innocence as evidence
of this." According to the majority, Schlup's evidence of innocence
should therefore carry less of a burden than Herrera's:
Schlup was based on a completely different issue than the constitutional quandary
presented by Herrera, i.e., whether the Constitution prevents the execution of an innocent
man, the majority believed it could avoid further controversy. But see infra note 169
(discussing the majority's treatment of Herrera-type claims).
164. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 851. Technically, Herrera did not ask for relief based solely
on his innocence, but brought his evidence of innocence as proof of his constitutional
claim-that the Texas state court had violated his constitutional rights by condemning him
to death when he was innocent. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859. The Herrera majority,
however, did not address Herrera's claim in this procedural posture, but instead looked
beyond the semantics of the claim and addressed it as a unified claim for relief based on
newly discovered evidence, stating,
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never
been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state proceeding.
Petitioner ... argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because newly
discovered evidence shows that his conviction is factually incorrect. The
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available "only where the prisoner
supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence."
Id. at 860,862 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,454 (1986)). Justice O'Connor
agreed with the majority's assessment:
[T]he issue.., is not whether a State can execute the innocent. It is... whether
a fairly convicted and therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled
to yet another judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew, ...
notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate that constitutional error infected his
trial.
I&. at 870 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
165. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862 (1993)).
166. Id.
167. The constitutional error asserted was the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, which
Schlup alleged had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 860.
168. See id. at 861.
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If there were no question about the fairness of the criminal
trial, a Herrera-type claim[ 69] would have to fail unless the
federal habeas court is itself convinced that those new facts
unquestionably establish Schlup's innocence. On the other
hand, if the habeas court were merely convinced that those
new facts raised sufficient doubt about Schlup's guilt to
undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the
assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional
error, Schlup's threshold showing of innocence would justify
a review of the merits of the constitutional claims.1 70
Having eliminated innocence-only claims from the picture, the
Court next set out to determine the proper standard to govern the
miscarriage of justice inquiry. The majority began with a brief history
of habeas corpus jurisprudence, detailing the expansion of the scope
of habeas corpus review, the consequent threat to "the finality of state
court judgments and to principles of comity and federalism,'' and
the response of Congress and the courts in the form of statutory"
and procedural barriers" to consideration of multiple petitions.74
The Court concluded that the end result of this response was "the
adoption in habeas corpus of a 'qualified application of the doctrine
of res judicata.' " 175
However, the majority noted that "habeas corpus is, at its core,
an equitable remedy,"'176 and that, as such, the Court had consis-
tently engaged in an equitable inquiry, balancing the individual's
interest in a trial free of constitutional error against the systemic
interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial resources, to
determine the applicability of habeas corpus review. 77 In cases like
169. The majority's eagerness to refer to "Herrera-type" claims as such is interesting,
in one respect because "Herrera-type" claims were never formally recognized in Herrera;
the Court merely assumed arguendo that such a claim was cognizable. Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 856, 869-70 (1993). Also, Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in
Schiup, joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera. Id at 876-84 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting). It is conceivable that Justice Stevens made conspicuous mention of "Herrera-
type" claims in Schlup in order to lend such claims some legitimacy beyond their mere
theoretical recognition in Herrera.
170. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 104-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these barriers.
174. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862.
175. Id at 863 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,486 (1989) (quoting S. REP.
No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966))).
176. Id.
177. Id at 863-64; see also supra notes 108-09, 114, 129-30 and accompanying text
(citing examples).
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Schlup's, the majority explained, the balance of equities favors a less
stringent standard than Sawyer. On the systemic side, the Court
reasoned that claims of innocence are much more rare than claims of
an improper sentence, and thus would pose less of a threat to judicial
resources and to principles of finality and comity.7 ' On the in-
dividual side, the Court pointed out the greater individual interest of
a person who is entirely innocent of the crime as opposed to one who
claims that his sentence is too severe.179  Given the smaller threat
178. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865-66. In the words of the Court,
Though challenges to the propriety of imposing a sentence of death are routinely
asserted in capital cases, experience has taught us that a substantial claim that
constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely
rare.... Even under the pre-Sawyer regime, "in virtually every case, the
allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected." The threat to
judicial resources, finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence is thus
significantly less than that posed by claims relating only to sentencing.
Id (citation omitted). In this passage, the Court defines the systemic interests at stake in
terms of the relative frequency of a given claim, much in the same way it has equated the
individual interests with actual innocence. See id at 864 ("[To ensure that] the
[miscarriage of justice] exception would extend relief to those who were truly deserving,
this Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner's
innocence."); cf Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1755 (1993) ("It is not reasonable
... to expect [instances in which a federal court overturns a state court conviction] to be
frequent enough to amount to a substantial cost of reviewing Miranda claims on habeas
or to raise federal-state tensions to an appreciable degree."). The intended effect seems
to be a system designed to allow as little review as possible, imposing a lower standard for
claims that are rarely brought and a higher standard for more frequent claims.
179. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 866. There are two flaws in the Court's logic on this point.
First, the majority seems to misread Sawyer, stating that a less severe burden of proof
should be imposed on "a habeas petitioner alleging a fundamental miscarriage of justice
than on one alleging that his sentence is too severe," and thus assuming that a situation
in which a prisoner is the victim of an inaccurate sentencing determination does not
implicate a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. However, the Sawyer Court ruled
that claims of "innocence" of the death penalty would be evaluated as to whether they
implicated a miscarriage of justice:
[I]t cannot be said that a reasonable juror would not have found both of the
aggravating factors which make [Sawyer] eligible for the death penalty.
Therefore.... petitioner has not shown that there would be a fundamental
miscarriage of justice for the Court to fail to reexamine the merits of this
successive claim.
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 350 (1992) (emphasis added). According to the Sawyer
Court, it seems, an incorrect death sentence is a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." To
read Sawyer otherwise one would need to supply a reason for the Court to allow an
exception to the procedural default rules without a showing either of cause and prejudice
or of a miscarriage of justice.
Second, it is certainly arguable that the degree of injustice is indistinguishable between
executing a prisoner who is innocent of the crime and executing a prisoner who is
"merely" innocent of the penalty. In both cases, the judicial system has put someone to
death who did not "deserve" to die.
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to systemic resources and the greater individual interests at stake, the
Court found that the Carrier standard,"s and not the Sawyer
standard, "properly strikes [the] balance when the claimed injustice
is that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent of the crime.' 181
In the third step of its analysis, the Court determined the proper
burden of evidence for Schlup to meet on remand." The pertinent
language of Carrier states: "[Iln an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default."''" However, the Carrier Court stopped short of providing
a test to determine when such a case has occurred, concluding merely
that Carrier's was not "extraordinary" enough.Y Drawing from
Carrier, Sawyer, and even In re Winship,185 the Schlup Court es-
tablished the threshold showing that a defendant seeking the use of
the exception would have to make, ruling that
[t]o establish the requisite probability [that is, that
constitutional error probably has resulted in the conviction
of someone who is actually innocent], the petitioner must
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
180. Although SchIup claimed that the proper standard in his case was the Kuhlmann
standard, the Court seemed to find that Carrier represented a further elaboration of the
Kuhlmann standard:
In addition to linking miscarriages of justice to innocence, Carrier, and
Kuhlmann also expressed the standard of proof that should govern consideration
of those claims. In Carrier, for example, the Court stated that the petitioner must
show that the constitutional error "probably" resulted in the conviction of one
who was actually innocent. The Kuhlmann plurality, though using the term
"colorable claim of factual innocence," elaborated that the petitioner would be
required to establish, by a" 'fair probability,' "that" 'the trier of the facts would
have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.' "
Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 n.17 (1986)
(quoting Friendly, supra note 130, at 160)).
181. Id. at 865.
182. See id. at 867-69. For a discussion of the disposition of the case on remand, see
infra note 186.
183. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added).
184. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("We have never until
today had to ... flesh out the standard of 'actual innocence' in the context of a habeas
petitioner claiming innocence of the crime. Thus, I agree [with the majority] that the
question of what threshold standard should govern is an open one.").
185. 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970) (striking down a New York criminal statute allowing
a conviction if the prosecution could prove guilt with a preponderance of the evidence;




would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.1 1
6
The majority justified this formulation for the same reasons it had
chosen the Carrier standard: to choose a burden sufficiently high to
keep the exception "rare," but not as rare as in Sawyer.' They did
so by choosing "more likely than not," which denotes a stronger
showing than that needed to establish prejudice," but is not as
stringent as the Sawyer standard, which requires "clear and convincing
evidence" of the petitioner's innocence. 9
The Court added several caveats to this formulation: The
miscarriage of justice exception, it stated, is tied to the petitioner's
actual, not legal, innocence.' 9 As such, the reviewing court is not
limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial, but also may
consider probative evidence illegally admitted or excluded, as well as
evidence unavailable at trial.' However, the Court cautioned, the
standard does not address the district court's independent judgment
as to whether a reasonable doubt exists, but its assessment of what a
reasonable jury would likely decide." 2
Finally, the majority distinguished its test from the test to
evaluate the constitutional sufficiency of evidence found in Jackson v.
Virginia,9' citing two main differences: First, the Jackson test is
186. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867. On remand, the district court ruled that Schlup's new
evidence of innocence met the standard articulated by the Supreme Court, and granted
him a hearing on the merits of his habeas petition, which was set for January 26, 1996.
Schlup v. Delo, No. 4:92CV443, 1995 WL 793315 at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 1995). As of
this writing, the district court has not handed down a ruling from the January hearing.
187. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
188. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (holding that test for
whether deficient performance by counsel has prejudiced defendant's case is "whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt").
189. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
190. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 ("The Carrier standard is intended to focus the
inquiry on actual innocence.").
191. Id Note that this emphasis on actual innocence and the corresponding effect upon
the evidence a reviewing court may consider come directly from the writings of Judge
Friendly. See Friendly, supra note 130, at 160.
192. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867-68. At this point in the opinion, the majority rephrased
the test in terms of a reasonable doubt, presenting the following: "[A] petitioner does not
meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the
new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 868. This Note suggests that the majority's choice of words at
this juncture may have had unforeseen repurcussions. See infra notes 218-21 and
accompanying text.
193. 443 U.S. 307 (1978). In Jackson, the petitioner had claimed that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him. Id. at 312. In denying his petition, the Court formulated a test
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used to determine the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict the
petitioner, and as such is limited to record evidence, unlike the Schiup
test.94 The second and more important difference between the
Jackson and Schiup tests is the nature of the inquiry involved."' 5
Jackson tests the constitutional power of the jury to reach a guilty
verdict, hence its use of the word "could," while the Schiup test is
probabilistic, focusing on the likely behavior of the jury; the use of the
word "would" and the phrase "more likely than not" reflect this. 6
The Court turned to the Eighth Circuit's application of Sawyer to
illustrate the difference. The Eighth Circuit held that Schlup did not
satisfy the Sawyer test because the trial record contained sufficient
evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict."9 However, the Eighth
Circuit made this ruling after assuming arguendo that all of Schlup's
evidence-sworn statements of eyewitnesses that he was not involved
in the crime, plus evidence that cast serious doubt on whether there
had been sufficient time for Schlup to commit the crime-was
true.' If a jury had found this to be the case, Justice Stevens
asserted, it is doubtful that they would have found proof enough to
convict beyond a reasonable doubt; the Eighth Circuit thus misapplied
Sawyer by using a "power to convict" test to evaluate a "likelihood
of conviction" standard. 99
Justice O'Connor added a short concurrence to "explain, in light
of the dissenting opinions, what [she understood] the court to decide
and what it [did] not."2' She first addressed Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concerns about the feasibility of the majority's test, 01
re-explaining the placement of the Schiup threshold showing of
evidence in the hierarchy between "prejudice" and Sawyer's "clear
for the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to convict, stating that a petitioner "is entitled
to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no
rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324. Note
the close similarity between this test and the Schiup majority's reformulation of their test
in terms of a reasonable doubt. See supra note 192. See infra notes 210-12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Chief Justice's reaction to this similarity.
194. Schiup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
195. Id.
196. Although this is an appealing theoretical distinction, the practical distinction
between the two standards may be less than the majority is willing to admit. See infra
notes 241-49 for a discussion of this issue.
197. See Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738,741 (8th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
198. Id.
199. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
200. Id. at 869 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. See id. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). See infra notes 207-23 and accom-
panying text for further discussion of the Chief Justice's dissent.
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and convincing" test.' However, she phrased the Schiup test in the
negative, stating that a petitioner will be denied the benefit of the
exception if "the distnct court believes it more likely than not that
there is any juror who, acting reasonably, would have found the
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' She also reaffirmed
the probability/power distinction between the Schiup and Jackson
tests.' Next, Justice O'Connor turned to Justice Scalia's contention
that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the question of whether to address a
successive petition should be left to the discretion of the district court
judge. 5 She responded by pointing out that the district court had
based its decision on an erroneous view of the law, thus committing
a "paradigmatic" abuse of discretion and obviating the need to pass
on the question of discretion.
The Chief Justice dissented to voice his concerns regarding the
inscrutability of the majority's standard and to express his own views
regarding the proper balance of the equities for Schlup-type
claims.2' He stated that while the standard "more likely than not"
is a traditional charge to a jury, a finding that "no reasonable juror
would have convicted in the light of the new evidence" is a conclusion
of law.' According to the Chief Justice, this "hybrid" standard
would prove to be a source of confusion for the lower federal
courts.209
Chief Justice Rehnquist also commented upon the similarity of
the majority's standard to the Jackson standard, asserting that the
202. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's reformulation of the Schiup
standard is also extremely close to the Jackson standard, as the Chief Justice points out
in his dissent. See id. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Under Jackson, 'the relevant
question is whether... any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' "(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319
(1979)).
204. Id at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. See id at 875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra notes 224-39 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Justice Scalia's dissent.
206. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). It appears, however, that Justice O'Connor
missed the point of Justice Scalia's statutory argument. According to Justice Scalia, the
district court was under no duty to use either Carrier or Sawyer and thus cannot be faulted
under an abuse-of-discretion analysis for using its discretion to choose either standard. See
i d at 877-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text
(responding to Justice Scalia's statutory concerns).
207. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Kennedy
and Thomas joined thisdissent. Id at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
209. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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only difference between the two standards is as to the body of
evidence that may be evaluated.210 Given the similarity between the
two standards, he felt that the Jackson standard, modified as to the
body of evidence to be considered, more faithfully reflected the
theory behind the Carrier holding.2 ' However, he stated that given
the choice between the Carrier standard and Sawyer, he would choose
Sawyer, which would provide a uniform test for both guilt- and
sentence-related claims and which, in his opinion, more faithfully
struck the proper balance between systemic and individual
interests.212
The Chief Justice's concerns, although understandable, are
arguably unjustified. Although he referred to the majority's standard
as a confusing hybrid of questions of law and fact, he failed to address
the fact that the Sawyer standard to which he gave his approval also
represents an admixture of traditional charges of law and fact.213
His misgivings regarding the Jackson standard are also misplaced.
Although he astutely pointed out the cosmetic similarity between the
two standards,214 he did not acknowledge the larger theoretical
differences between them. The Chief Justice claimed, correctly, that
under either Jackson or Schiup the petitioner would be denied relief
210. Id. at 873-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 874 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
212. hM (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
213. As the majority pointed out,
[The Carrier standard] is no more a mixing of apples and oranges than is the
standard adopted by the Court in Sawyer. Though it is true that" '[m]ore likely
than not' "is a "quintessential charge to a finder of fact," that is equally true of
the "clear and convincing evidence" component of the Sawyer formulation ....
Nor do we accept THE CHIEF JUSTICE's description of the Carrier
standard as a "hybrid." Finders of fact are often called upon to make predictions
about the likely actions of hypothetical "reasonable" actors. Thus the application
[in Schlup] is neither illogical nor unusual.
Id. at 868 n.48 (citations omitted).
214. The Chief Justice wrote: "[A]s the Court acknowledges, a petitioner making a
claim of actual innocence under Carrier falls short of satisfying his burden if the reviewing
court determines that any juror reasonably would have found petitioner guilty of the
crime." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at
870 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,318-19 (1979) (containing
similar language to describe the test for constitutional sufficiency of evidence to convict)).
The language of the two standards is indeed very similar. The Schiup majority states
that "the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence," Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867
(emphasis added), while the equivalent language from Jackson states that the petitioner
"is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that... no rational trier of fact could have




if the reviewing court found that any juror would have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt215 However, despite the cosmetic
similarity between the two standards, the reason under each for denial
of relief is quite different. Under Jackson, this finding forecloses
review of a petitioner's claim because a finder of fact that would have
found evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
obviously had the constitutional power to do so, thus satisfying the
Jackson test."16 Under Schlup, if a juror would have found
petitioner guilty, it is axiomatic that petitioner's evidence has failed
to meet the necessary standard of probability for a jury to find him
not guilty.
217
The apparent confusion in the Chief Justice's dissent may stem
from the "no juror" language in the majority's reformulation of the
test, which states that "a petitioner does not meet the threshold
requirement unless he persuades the district court that.., no juror,
acting reasonably, would have voted to find him not guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt., 211 It is debatable, however, whether the majority
intended a strictly literal reading of the words "no juror." '219 As one
recent commentator pointed out, reading the test literally means that
a petitioner will be denied relief if the lower court decides that one
juror out of one hundred would find the petitioner guilty.'
However, Schlup purports to establish "more likely than not" as the
standard of review; it would be nonsensical to deny relief under this
standard to a petitioner whom ninety-nine out of one hundred jurors
would acquit. Even more nonsensically, the "no juror" language
suggests that more than one juror must be considered, forcing a
reviewing judge to invent a host of fictional jurors and speculate as to
their individual hypothetical decisions. A reading more consistent
with the majority's stated intent would substitute "jury" for "juror" at
215. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 873 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
217. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868. However, this Note posits that while theoretical
differences between the Schiup and Jackson standards exist, as the above example shows,
their practical application may lead to much the same results. See infra notes 241-49 and
accompanying text.
218. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868 (emphasis added).
219. In the quoted passage, Justice Stevens used the -word "juror" to emphasize that
in evaluating petitions under the Schiup standard, a district court should base its ruling on
the likely behavior of jurors, and not on its own opinion as to a petitioner's guilt or
innocence. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
220. See Joseph M. Ditkoff, Recent Development, The Ever More Complicated "Actual
Innocence" Gateway to Habeas Review: Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 898 (1995).
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the appropriate place in the test, thus inviting the reviewing judge to
consider the likely behavior of the jury as a whole and avoiding the
logical inconsistency described above." t
The Chief Justice's preference for the Sawyer standard is also
difficult to defend. The majority states, fairly convincingly, that there
exists in a Schlup-type claim both a greater individual interest2" and
a lesser state interest" than in a Sawyer-type claim. One need only
accept one of these credible assertions to come to the conclusion that
the balance of equities in Schiup is weighted more in the favor of the
petitioner than the corresponding balance of equities in Sawyer, and
therefore that the Sawyer test is inappropriate when a petitioner
presents a claim bolstered by evidence that she is innocent of the
crime.
Justice Scalia's response to the majority was intriguing. He read
the majority opinion as requiring a federal habeas court to entertain
an otherwise defaulted petition if the petitioner meets the
SchluplCarrier standard.' Calling attention to the section of the
United States Code governing subsequent petitions,2 he stated that
the majority's analysis failed to take into account the language of the
statute, which he contended was controlling in this situation.2 6
221. Unfortunately, at least one court has already relied on the "no juror" language to
deny habeas review under Schiup. In Fairchild v. Norris, 51 F.3d 129 (8th Cir. 1995), the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Barry Lee Fairchild's petition, stating, "We hold...
that at least one juror, acting reasonably and properly instructed, would have found
petitioner [guilty]." Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). This statement begs the question as
to how many jurors the court believed would have acquitted Fairchild.
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
224. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, he stated:
[The Kuhlmann holding] contains two complementary propositions .... The
second is that a habeas court must hear a claim of actual innocence and reach the
merits of the petition if the claim is sufficiently persuasive.... It is the Court's
prerogative to adopt that dictum today, but to adopt it without analysis, as
though it were binding precedent, will not do.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). This section states in pertinent part:
[A] subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus ... need not be
entertained by a court of the United States... unless the application alleges and
is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the
earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the
newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
Id.




Justice Scalia also found fault with the majority for basing the
authority to circumscribe the district courts' discretion on the
Kuhlmann holding, which, he observed, had been announced by a
mere plurality and as such had no precedential value. 7 Moreover,
he contended, the language from Kuhlmann implying that a federal
court is required to hear a successive petition upon a threshold
showing of evidence was not only pure dictum, I but was indefen-
sible when read against the language of the statute, which states
specifically that a court "need not" hear successive petitions, except
as provided by statute' 9 Justice Scalia also objected to the effect
of the Schlup holding, which he felt crossed the line from guiding the
discretion of the lower federal courts "to eliminat[ing] it entirely,
dividing the entire universe of successive and abusive petitions into
those that must not be entertained ... and those that must be
entertained [thus converting] a statute redolent of permissiveness...
into a rigid command."'  Finally, he addressed the majority's
The reader of today's opinion will be unencumbered with knowledge of [28
U.S.C. § 2244], since it is not there discussed or quoted, and indeed is only cited
en passant. Rather than asking what the statute says, or even what we have said
the statute says, the Court asks only what is the fairest standard to apply, and
answers that question by looking to the various semi-consistent standards
articulated in our most recent decisions-minutely parsing phrases, and seeking
shades of meaning in the interstices of words, as though a discursive judicial
opinion were a statute. I would proceed differently.
Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). One commentator has proposed
that this biting sarcasm is the product of what he calls the "Frankfurterization" of Justice
Scalia. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Crowded Center, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 78:
In some ways, Scalia appears to be following the pattern of Justice Felix
Frankfurter, ... like Scalia a former law professor, [who] went on to the Court
convinced he was smarter than many of his colleagues and had the "right"
answers to many constitutional questions. Frankfurter became increasingly
frustrated when his brethren would not go along with his views, and his rhetoric
became increasingly strident.
Id. at 80 (citation omitted).
227. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 877 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 138 for further
discussion of the precedential weight of Kuhlmann.
228. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988); see also supra note 225 (quoting pertinent section
of statute).
230. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 877 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). However,
Justice Scalia's outrage at this effect is seemingly inconsistent with his support for the
Court's per curiam decision in Stokes v. Delo, 495 U.S. 320 (1990) (per curiam). In Stokes,
the Court ruled that granting a stay of execution in order to address claims in a clearly
abusive petition constituted an "abuse of discretion," and vacated the stay. Id. at 322.
Thus, the Court seemed to hold that addressing an abusive petition, absent either "cause
and prejudice" or a factual innocence exception, is always an abuse of discretion, creating
the sort of "rigid command" that is at the heart of Justice Scalia's dissatisfaction with the
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contention that federal habeas corpus jurisprudence has historically
been governed by equitable principles, ' 1 reading two possible
meanings into this assertion: If the majority's commitment to
equitable principles referred to a process of filling gaps and am-
biguities in the habeas statute, he stated, then the majority should
have explained why the statute did not apply to the case at hand."
On the other hand, he warned, if the majority's reasoning meant that
it had relegated the statute to the status of an "equitable con-
sideration," their decision would be unconstitutional, as the federal
courts have no inherent power to issue the writ 3  Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded, the majority could not avoid confronting the statute,
and as he found no abuse of discretion in the record, the decision of
the Eighth Circuit should have been affirmed.'T
Although the reasoning of Justice Scalia's statutory argument is
sound, his dissent appears to be based on a fundamental misreading
of the majority opinion. At no point in Schlup did the majority state
that a habeas court must reach the merits of a successive petition if
the petitioner makes the threshold showing. On the contrary, the
majority asserted that it is this threshold showing that allows the
habeas court to reach the merits. 5 Justice Scalia's dissent seems to
argue that the Court's reversal and remand represents the proposition
h6lding in Schlup.
231. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 863 n.35 ("This Court has repeatedly noted the interplay
between statutory language and judicially-managed equitable considerations in the
development of habeas corpus jurisprudence.").
232. See id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Again, Justice Scalia's assertion of error on
the part of the majority appears to conflict with his stance on an earlier issue. See supra
note 230. Although he scoffs at the majority's homage to traditional equitable principles,
just a few years earlier, he had joined the majority opinion in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467 (1991), which states that "Congress did not intend [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(b) to foreclose
application of the court-announced principles defining and limiting a district court's
discretion to entertain abusive petitions." Id at 487 (emphasis added). Interestingly
enough, as support for the quoted passage the McCleskey opinion cites Stokes, 495 U.S.
320. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text for further discussion of Stokes.
233. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 75, 94-95 (1807)).
234. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., id. at 861 ("[New evidence of innocence is needed to establish] a
miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred
claim.") (emphasis added); id at 862 ("Schlup's threshold showing of innocence would
justify a review of the merits of [his petition] .... [The Court's recent decisions] delineate
the circumstances under which a district court may consider claims raised in a [successive]
petition.") (emphasis added); id. at 865 ("[Clause and prejudice would generally define the
situations in which a federal court might entertain an abusive petition, [but] the Court
recognized an exception for [miscarriages of justice].") (emphasis added).
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that the district court must hear Schlup's claim on the merits if he
meets the threshold standard. However, as Justice O'Connor
explained in her concurrence, the case was remanded because the
district court based its conclusion on an erroneous view of the
law. 1 6 A simpler answer to Justice Scalia's concerns is that, pruden-
tial or not, the doctrine advocated by the Kuhlmann plurality 7 has
been adopted by the Court,"8 allowing the Court to channel the
discretion of the lower courts via its definition of the "ends of
justice.' ' 9
Despite the apparent weaknesses of the stances advocated by the
dissenting opinions, they do make an important contribution to the
opinion, for the points raised by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia reveal
shortcomings in the majority opinion that the Court will need to
address in the future.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, although in the minority in his as-
sessment of the proper test for the sufficiency of the petitioner's
evidence of innocence, is certainly justified in expressing concern over
the degree of difficulty that will accompany the application of the
Schiup standard. The Schlup majority takes pains to distinguish its
"probabilistic" test from the test of constitutional-power-to-convict set
forth in Jackson, describing the difference as follows:
236. Justice O'Connor explained her reasoning as follows:
Having decided that the district court committed legal error, and thus abused its
discretion by relying on Sawyer v. Whitley, ... the court need not decide the
question... whether abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review.... In
reversing the judgment... the Court does not disturb the traditional discretion
of district courts in this area ....
Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The last part of this passage is
slightly disturbing; Justice O'Connor speaks about the "traditional," as opposed to the
"statutory" discretion of district courts, intimating that she may not accept that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244, as interpreted in Kuhlmann, see supra notes 131-35, is on point.
237. Kuhlmann advocated reading into 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988) a Congressional
intent to include consideration for the "ends of justice." See supra notes 131-35 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Kuhlmann and its implications.
238. In fact, in his dissent, Justice Scalia cites a number of cases that have cited
Kuhlmann with approval. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 877-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). To this list may be added Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) ("[O]ur cases have moved in the direction of reaffirming the
relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in determining the available scope of habeas
review. See, e.g., [Kuhlmann].").
239. But cf Steiker, supra note 19, at 344-46 (claiming that the Sanders Court's
interpretation betrayed the statutory language and confirmed that the scope of federal
habeas was a matter of federal common law rather than statutory interpretation).
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Under Jackson, the question whether the trier of fact has
power to make a finding of guilt requires a binary response:
either the trier of fact has power as a matter of law or it
does not. Under Carrier, in contrast, the habeas court must
consider what reasonable triers of fact are likely to do.2"
While the theoretical difference between the two standards is easily
discernible, however, their practical differences are more difficult to
uncover.41 In fact, when one presumes, as directed by the Schlup
majority, that a reasonable juror "would consider fairly all of the
evidence presented," and "would conscientiously obey the instructions
of the trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,""24 the
Schiup test takes on a binary nature similar to that of Jackson.243
A jury confronted with new evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt does not have the power to convict,2' and therefore cannot.
Conversely, if the new evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt
then the jury is by definition convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
petitioner's guilt and has no motive to acquit.
Thus, the true focus of the inquiry is the likelihood that a
petitioner's new evidence will raise a reasonable doubt of her
guilt.245  But where does variability enter the calculus? Given a
certain quantum of evidence, what makes one reasonable trier of fact
vote to acquit and another vote to convict? The answer, of course, is
their respective evaluations regarding the credibility and probative
240. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
241. In attempting to isolate the differences between the two standards, this Note will
ignore the different bodies of evidence examined by the two standards, see Schlup, 115 S.
Ct. at 867. Instead, this Note will focus solely on the nature of the evaluation, given a
certain quantity of evidence.
242. Id at 868.
243. Consider this example: A petitioner seeking review of her otherwise defaulted
claims makes an evidentiary showing such that if it were record evidence evaluated under
Jackson, i.e., in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would warrant habeas relief.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). At this point, there is no probabilistic
determination: A jury presented with this evidence would not have the constitutional
power to convict under Winship, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970), and
therefore the likelihood that they will convict is zero.
244. See, eg., Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-18; Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64.
245. Thus, the majority's contention that "[t]he meaning of actual innocence.., does
not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new
evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty,"
Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868, rings false in the face of the constitutional command of Winship,
for the factfinder's decision to convict cannot be made independently of its assessment of
the existence of a reasonable doubt of guilt.
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force of the evidence.2' Here is where the true difference between
Schiup and Jackson lies. Under Jackson, the factors that produce
variability between verdicts are eliminated, because the reviewing
court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution.247  Yet, it is precisely these factors-differences in
juror opinions regarding credibility and probative value of
evidence-that produce the different possibilities crucial to a
probabilistic test, such as the one in Schlup. The majority does not
seem to consider this difference very important,2' but aside from
the larger body of evidence allowed under the Schlup inquiry, it is the
crucial practical distinction between the two standards, a fine one that
might be overlooked in the mass of petitions alleging "actual
innocence" that will almost certainly follow the decision in Schlup.249
246. This assumes, as the Schiup standard directs, a completely reasonable finder of
fact, one whom, it is presumed, does not make her decision based upon extraneous
sentiments. Cf. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(upholding constitutionality of jury instruction during penalty phase of capital trial
directing jurors not to be "swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling").
247. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ("[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
248. In fact, the majority seems to indicate that credibility assessments will not be
necessary in every case: "[U]nder the gateway standard we describe today, the newly
presented evidence may indeed call into question the credibility of the witnesses presented
at trial. In such a case, the habeas court may have to make some credibility assessments."
Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868 (emphasis added).
249. As of this writing, at least 29 reported decisions in the lower federal courts have
been based in whole or in part on Schlup. See, e.g., Brownlow v. Groose, 66 F.3d 997, 999
(8th Cir. 1995); Commer Glass v. Vaughn, 65 F.3d 13, 16-17 (3d Cir. 1995); Battle v. Delo,
64 F.3d 347, 350-54 (8th Cir. 1995); Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 1995);
Whitmore v. Avery, 63 F.3d 688, 689-91 (8th Cir. 1995); George v. Perrill 62 F.3d 333, 335
(10th Cir. 1995); Oxford v. Delo, 59 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. Ward, 59
F.3d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 1995); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717-18 (1st Cir. 1995);
Weekley v. Jones, 56 F.3d 889, 895 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Delo, 56 F.3d 878, 881-84
(8th Cir. 1995); Allen v. Nix, 55 F.3d 414,417 (8th Cir. 1995); Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d
1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995); Ward v. Cain, 53 F.3d 106, 107 n.5, 108 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995);
Fairchild v. Norris, 51 F.3d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1995); Whitlock v. Godinez, 51 F.3d 59,62-64
(7th Cir. 1995); Barrington v. Norris, 49 F.3d 440, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1995); Nachtigall v.
Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1995); Washington v. Delo, 51 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.
1995); Deere v. Calderon, 890 F. Supp. 893, 904 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Bolender v. Singletary,
898 F. Supp. 876, 881-82 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Galeska v. Duncan, 894 F. Supp. 1375, 1379-80
(C.D. Cal 1995); United States ex reL Balderas v. Godinez, 890 F. Supp. 732, 744 n.17
(N.D. III. 1995); McGann v. Kelly, 891 F. Supp. 128, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Schneider v.
Delo, 890 F. Supp. 791, 820 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Meatley v. Artuz, 886 F. Supp. 1009, 1017
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Carpenter v. Vaughn, 888 F. Supp. 658, 660-62 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Ward
v. Whitley, 887 F. Supp. 897, 900-01 (E.D. La. 1995); Perry v. Norris, 879 F. Supp. 1503,
1523-24 (E.D. Ark. 1995).
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Justice Scalia's dissent raises concerns about the process as well.
His charge that the majority has turned "a statute redolent of
permissiveness into a rigid command""0 is not quite accurate, but
it does prompt an interesting question: When does "may" equal
"must"? In Stokes v. Delo,2s' the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri granted a stay of execution in order to review the
merits of Stokes' clearly abusive fourth habeas petition. 2  The
Court ruled that this constituted an abuse of discretion, and conse-
quently vacated the stay.23 The habeas statute states that a district
court "need not" entertain an abusive petition; it does not mandate
that the district court deny the application.' Yet the Court, to
quote Justice Scalia, specifically "divid[ed] the entire universe of...
abusive petitions."'  By stating in effect that it is always an abuse
of discretion to entertain an abusive petition absent a recognized
justification, the Stokes Court created a category of petitions that must
not be entertained on pain of reversal. Using this rationale, the Court
theoretically could create another such category for Schlup-type
claims; it is arguable that it would be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to reject a petition, abusive or otherwise, that implicates
a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."
These inconsistencies in the Schlup test to which the dissenters
give their attention defy easy explanation. However, one of the
causes may lie in the roots of the "post-Warren" Court's habeas
jurisprudence, the philosophical background of which may be found
in part in two extremely influential but very dissimilar law review
articles, both critical of the Warren Court's expansion of the scope of
habeas.
In Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, Professor Paul Bator argues that habeas review of state
court decisions should be reserved for those instances in which the
state's own mechanisms for adjudication of constitutional claims have
proven inadequate. 6 Professor Bator's "process-oriented" view of
250. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 877 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. 495 U.S. 320 (1990) (per curiam).
252. Id at 321.
253. Id. at 322.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988).
255. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 877 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,441-45 (1963); see also Patchel, supra note 11, at 943-53




habeas holds that ultimate truth will never be discovered through a
judicial proceeding, and thus attempts to correct "wrong" or "in-
correct" proceedings are by definition futile. 7  Therefore, the
choice of whether to review a state court decision should be based on
policy considerations rather than an interest in accuracy5
8
In the second article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on State Court Judgments, Judge Henry Friendly argues for the
restriction of habeas review based on the idea that unlimited habeas
review interferes with what he considers the basic goal of the criminal
justice system: to separate the guilty from the inmocent.2 9 Thus,
with a few exceptions, habeas corpus relief should be reserved for
those cases in which "a convicted defendant makes a colorable
showing that an error, whether 'constitutional' or not, may be
producing the continued punishment of an innocent man."'
The views of these two scholars have pervaded the Court's
habeas jurisprudence over the past twenty years.2 6 For example,
Professor Seidman states that Stone, which began the retreat from the
Warren Court's activist approach to habeas review, seemed to use
Judge Friendly's rhetoric to promulgate Professor Bator's ap-
proach.262  As evaluated by the Stone Court, the "costs" of the
exclusionary rule come from those instances in which it operates to
free guilty prisoners, a concern clearly lifted from the writings of
Judge Friendly:
Application of the [exclusionary] rule ... deflects the
truth finding process and often frees the guilty. The
disparity in particular cases between the error committed by
the police and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by
257. See Bator, supra note 256, at 446-50.
258. See iL at 449-53; Patchel, supra note 11, at 943-45.
259. See Friendly, supra note 130, at 149; Seidman, supra note 114, at 456-57.
260. Friendly, supra note 130, at 160 (footnote omitted).
261. A number of Supreme Court habeas decisions cite prominently to Professor Bator
and Judge Friendly. See, e.g., Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 n.37, 867 n.46, 872 (citing Judge
Friendly); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 880, 883 (1993) (citing Judge Friendly);
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,339 n.5 (1992) (citing Judge Friendly); Id. at 361 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Judge Friendly); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
478, 492, 518 (1991) (citing Professor Bator); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453-54
nn.14, 16 & 17 (1986) (citing Judge Friendly); id. at 453 n.14 (citing Professor Bator);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 n.31, 127 n.32 (1982) (citing Judge Friendly); id. at 127
n.32, 128 n.33 (citing Professor Bator); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77 n.6 (1977)
(citing Professor Bator); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480 n.13, 491 n.31, 500 (1976)
(citing Judge Friendly); id. at 476 n.8, 476 n.9, 494 n.35 (citing Professor Bator).
262. See Seidman, supra note 114, at 456-59; Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.35 (quoting Bator,
supra note 256, at 509).
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application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.... These
... costs of the rule persist when a criminal conviction is
sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground
that a search-and-seizure claim was erroneously rejected by
two or more tiers of state courts.263
However, the Stone doctrine bars habeas relief when state court
procedure has afforded the petitioner an adequate forum, his actual
guilt notwithstanding: "[W]here the State has provided an oppor-
tunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial. ',264  This reflects Professor Bator's
process-oriented rationale for habeas review, and not Judge Friendly's
concern for the propriety of the verdict; whether the petitioner has
been granted a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate her claim has
nothing to do with her innocence.2
The use of Judge Friendly's values but Professor Bator's
approach is evident in the Schiup decision as well. The basis of the
test, the petitioner's "actual innocence," clearly reflects Judge
Friendly's concerns. However, in administering the Schiup test, the
reviewing court is guided by Professor Bator's epistemological
skepticism: Rather than determining for itself the ultimate "truth"
regarding the petitioner's innocence, the reviewing court must instead
look to the finder of fact and hypothesize as to its probable decision,
in terms of a reasonable doubt.266 If a petitioner achieves review of
the. merits of her petition under Schlup, it is not because she is
innocent, but because her new evidence seems to indicate that the
process has failed, and a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" has
possibly occurred. The admixture of these not-entirely-compatible
theories has created a habeas corpus jurisprudence the complexity of
263. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-91 (footnotes omitted). Although the Stone opinion does
not explicitly cite to Judge Friendly in the quoted passage as it does at other points in the
opinion, see supra note 261, his influence is clearly present. See Patchel, supra note 11, at
961.
264. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (footnotes omitted).
265. See Patchel, supra note 11, at 961; Seidman, supra note 114, at 456.
266. In the majority's words: "It is not the district court's independent judgment as to
whether reasonable doubt exists that the [Schlup] standard addresses; rather the standard
requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
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which has been criticized by commentators 67 and the Chief Jus-
tice2l alike, and which has resulted in decisions laden with uncer-
tainty, like that in Schiup.
In Schlup, the majority's analysis was logical and well-reasoned,
with a few minor exceptions.269 The majority adhered to the
Supreme Court's post-Stone habeas jurisprudence, balancing the
systemic interests against Schlup's individual interest and using that
calculus to establish a threshold showing of evidence that "properly
balances the dictates of justice with the need to ensure that the actual
innocence exception remains only a ' "safety valve" for the "extra-
ordinary case." ' "7 However, sometimes following precedent is
insufficient. The concerns about the extra-statutory theoretical basis
of the standard and about the difficulty of its application will only
increase with the complexity of habeas petitions presented to the
Court for review. Already, cases in the federal system are testing the
limits of Schlup.271
The apparent flaws in Schiup may be traced not to the reasoning
of the majority, but to the Court's habeas jurisprudence over the last
267. See, e.g., Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for
a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1993).
268. "The present state of our habeas jurisprudence is less than ideal in its complexity,
but today's decision needlessly adds to that complexity." Schtup, 115 S. Ct. at 874
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
269. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
270. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. The next likely subject for debate is that of mens rea as it pertains to "actual
innocence." In Jones v. Delo, 56 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), the petitioner asked the Eighth
Circuit to reach the merits of his defaulted petition, presenting evidence that he suffered
from an organic brain disease that rendered him incapable of forming the necessary mental
state for capital murder. Id. at 882. Although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of the petition on other grounds, the opinion also stated: "Should
[petitioner's] contention that he could not deliberate prove true, he would have been
incapable of satisfying an essential element of the crime for which he was convicted. This
meets the definition of actual innocence." Id. at 883 (citation omitted). However, the
District Court for the Central District of California came to quite a different conclusion
in Deere v. Calderon, 890 F. Supp. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1995). As in Jones v. Delo, the
petitioner in Deere claimed that he was insane at the time of his crimes and sought review
of his procedurally defaulted claims under Schlup. Id. at 904. In denying the petition, the
district court stated:
The clear example of actual innocence is where the wrong person has been
convicted. Stated another way, "the quintessential miscarriage of justice is the
execution of a person who is entirely innocent." An insanity defense is the
opposite of actual innocence: it concedes the act, but interposes a bar to legal
responsibility.
Id. at 904 (citations and footnote omitted). If the Ninth Circuit affirms Deere, it seems
only logical that the Supreme Court will eventually be called upon to settle the split in the
circuit courts.
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two decades, which seeks to balance a host of competing concerns:
individual interests in justice, systemic interests in finality and
conservation of resources, the mandate of Judge Friendly that habeas
review should be reserved for the innocent, and the equally compel-
ling claim of Professor Bator that it should instead be used to "fix"
the system when it breaks down. However, in trying to thread its way
through this doctrinal maze, the Court seems to have lost sight of the
original purpose of the Great Writ-to provide a remedy for
constitutional wrongs 2 -- and instead has created a complex system
rife with contradiction, the only purpose of which seems to many
petitioners to be allowing as little review as possible. Until the Court
solves the inherent doctrinal difficulties in a system that combines
unlimited jurisdiction with limited discretion, confusion in its habeas
corpus jurisprudence, like that in Schiup v. Delo, is inevitable.
ROBERT C. STACY II
272. Recall the words of Justice Brennan in Noia:
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.
For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for
whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in
a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for
a man's imprisonment ....
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1962).
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